




There	 is	 an	 account	 of	modal	 operators	 that	 is	 both	 elegant	 and	 powerful	 and	 that	
deserves	to	be	called	the	standard	account.	There	are,	however,	some	epistemic	uses	
of	modal	 operators	which	 seem	 to	 be	 counterexamples	 to	 the	 account	 –	 they	 pose	
what	I	call	the	objectivity	problem.	It	is	often	thought	that	the	objectivity	problem	can	
be	fixed	by	a	certain	kind	of	modification	to	the	standard	account.	I	argue	that	this	kind	







According	 to	 what	 I	 shall	 call	 the	 standard	 account	 of	 possibility	 operators,	 an	
utterance	of	 ‘Possibly	S’	(and	its	variants	 ‘It	 is	possible	that	S’,	 ‘It	might	be	that	S’,	 ‘It	
can	be	that	S’,	etc.)	 in	a	context	C	is	true	if	and	only	if	the	prejacent	(the	proposition	
expressed	 by	 S	 in	 C)	 is	 compatible	 with	 the	 conversational	 background	 (a	 set	 of	
propositions	determined	by	C).1	If	we	analyze	compatibility	in	terms	of	worlds	then	we	
can	put	it	this	way:	the	utterance	is	true	iff	there	is	a	world	in	which	the	prejacent	and	
the	 propositions	 in	 the	 conversational	 background	 are	 all	 true.	 Different	 kinds	 of	




















that	bay;	more	careful	examination	of	 the	 log	 shows	 that	 the	boat	must	have	
gone	 down	 at	 least	 thirty	miles	 further	 south.	 The	mate	 said	 something	 false	
                                                
1		 See	Kratzer	(1977,	1981,	1991),	and	von	Fintel	(2006).	
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that	 the	 truth	of	an	epistemic	utterance	of	 ‘Possibly	S’	can	depend	upon	 facts	about	
the	world	 that	are	not	known	 to	anyone	at	 the	 time,	 contrary	 to	what	 the	 standard	
account	predicts.	Call	this	the	objectivity	problem.	
	
Not	 everyone	 agrees	 that	 the	 mate’s	 utterance	 is	 false.	 They	 ask:	 “Why	 is	 it	 not	
epistemically	 possible	 that	 the	wreck	 is	 in	 that	 bay,	 given	 that	 it	 is	 compatible	with	
what	 anyone	 knows	 at	 the	 time	 that	 it	 is?	 Perhaps	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 in	 some	 other	
sense,	but	in	an	epistemic	sense	it	is.”	If	they	are	right	that	the	mate’s	utterance	is	not	
false	then	there	is	no	problem	here	for	the	standard	account.	But	many	people	agree	





One	 popular	 way	 of	 dealing	 with	 the	 objectivity	 problem	 is	 to	 allow	 that	 the	
conversational	 background	determined	by	 an	epistemic	utterance	of	 ‘Possibly	 S’	 can	
include	not	just	what	is	known	(by	some	person	or	group	of	persons)	but	also	what	can	





It	 is	 well	 known	 that	 the	 popular	 fix	 needs	 to	 place	 restrictions	 on	 what	 counts	 as	
knowable	 relative	 to	 an	 utterance	of	 ‘Possibly	 S’,	 or	 else	 there	 are	many	utterances	
that	it	wrongly	predicts	to	be	false.	Take	any	location	L	for	which	an	utterance	by	the	





Hacking	 (1967)	 proposes	 that	 only	 things	 that	 can	 be	 known	 by	 some	 practical	
investigation	 count	 as	 things	 that	 can	 be	 known	 (diving	 at	 L	 and	 looking	 is	 not	




















400	 books	 on	 his	 bookshelf	 and	 is	 not	 open	 to	 it	 being	 otherwise.	 He	 is	
wondering	whether	it	was	between	200	and	300	or	between	300	and	400,	and	
asserts	‘It	might	have	been	between	200	and	300’.	If	in	fact	Descartes	had	only	
ten	 books	 on	 his	 bookshelf	 then	 John’s	 utterance	 is	 false.	 But	 the	 fact	 that	







He	 thinks	 that	 she	 stands	 a	 good	 chance	 and	 asserts	 ‘Mary	 might	 be	 the	
prettiest	 thin	girl’.	But	Mary	 is	not	even	 thin,	 so	 John’s	utterance	 is	 false,	and	
the	 fact	 that	Mary	 is	 not	 thin	 is	 not	 something	 that	 John	 or	 anyone	 else	 can	
know.	
	
Third	 example.	 Suppose	 that	 John	 thinks	 that	 it	 is	 not	 an	unknown	 truth	 that	
there	 is	 life	on	 Jupiter	and	 is	not	open	 to	 it	being	otherwise.	He	 is	wondering	
whether	 it	 is	 (a)	 false,	or	 (b)	 true	but	not	known.	He	asserts	 ‘It	might	be	 false	
that	there	is	life	on	Jupiter’.	If	in	fact	it	is	an	unknown	truth	that	there	is	life	on	






the	 time	 knows.	 According	 to	 the	 standard	 fix,	 the	 utterance	 is	 false	 because	 q	 is	












utterance.	This	 is	a	 feature	of	all	 the	above	cases	 that	 I	haven’t	yet	emphasized,	but	
one	that	is	important.	On	the	most	natural	way	of	understanding	the	salvage	ship	case,	
the	mate	is	not	open	to	the	log’s	ruling	out	that	the	wreck	is	in	that	bay.	But	if	we	add	
to	 the	 story	 that	 he	 is	 (that	 he	 has	 some	doubts	 about	 his	 calculations),	 then	many	
now	judge	that	the	mate’s	utterance	 is	 true,	and	that	upon	re-examining	the	 log	the	










in	 that	 bay’	 is	 false);	 if	 the	mate	 is	 open	 to	 p	 then	 p	 cannot	 be	 known	 (so	 that	 his	









John	 rolls	 a	 die	 and	 it	 comes	 up	 ‘3’.	 He	 asserts,	 ‘I	 might	 have	 rolled	 a	 ‘2’’	
(intending	 a	 metaphysical	 reading).	 There	 are	 worlds	 in	 which	 the	 prejacent	
(that	 John	 rolled	a	 ‘2’)	 and	 the	propositions	 in	 the	 conversational	background	
(the	 metaphysical	 laws)	 are	 all	 true,	 so	 on	 the	 standard	 account	 John’s	
utterance	is	true.	But	if	the	die	that	John	is	using	has	a	‘3’	on	all	sides	then	his	




John	 is	 looking	 for	 a	 parking	 space	 in	 downtown	 Ithaca.	 The	 Ithaca	 council	
provides	special	parking	spaces	for	 fuel	efficient	cars.	Pointing	to	one	of	these	
spaces	John	asserts,	 ‘I	can	park	there’	 (intending	a	deontic	reading).	There	are	









not	 just	 things	 that	 are	metaphysical	 laws	 but	 also	 things	 that	 can	 be	metaphysical	
laws,	and	it	can	be	a	metaphysical	law	that	John	uses	a	die	with	a	‘3’	on	all	sides;	in	the	
deontic	 case,	 the	 conversational	 background	 can	 include	 not	 just	 things	 that	 are	
parking	 regulations	 but	 also	 things	 that	 can	 be	 parking	 regulations,	 and	 it	 can	 be	 a	
parking	 regulation	 that	 John	 drives	 a	 Hummer.	 This	 does	 not	 seem	 like	 a	 promising	




observation	–	 that	 the	 truth	of	 an	utterance	of	 ‘Possibly	 S’	 can	depend	on	what	 the	
speaker	is	open	to	at	the	time	of	the	utterance.	What	we	would	like	is	a	solution	to	the	
objectivity	problem	and	an	explanation	of	the	openness	observation	that	extends	to	all	

















the	moment	 that	 she	 is	 (I	will	 offer	 an	 explanation	of	 this	 below).	 The	 case	poses	 a	
problem	 for	 the	 standard	 account.	 According	 to	 the	 standard	 account,	 John’s	
utterance	is	false	just	in	case	it	is	not	compatible	with	the	conversational	background	
(a	body	of	knowledge)	that	the	ball	is	under	cup	1.	So	if	the	eavesdropper	is	correct	to	
judge	 ‘false’,	 then	 the	 conversational	 background	 cannot	 be	 merely	 John’s	 body	 of	
knowledge,	because	it	is	compatible	with	what	John	knows	that	the	ball	is	under	cup	1.	
If	the	conversational	background	includes	the	eavesdropper’s	body	of	knowledge	then	
we	get	 the	result	 that	 the	eavesdropper	 is	correct	 to	 judge	 ‘false’,	but	 then	we	have	
trouble	explaining	why	John	is	warranted	in	making	the	assertion	in	the	first	place	–	he	
has	no	idea	(we	can	add)	whether	or	not	he	has	an	eavesdropper,	or	how	much	such	








or	 false	 simpliciter	 but	 only	 relative	 to	 an	 assessor	 and	 a	 time.	 In	 particular,	 an	




is	under	cup	1)	and	that	 is	why	John	 is	 justified	 in	making	the	assertion	 (perhaps	we	
need	to	add	that	John	knows	that	his	utterance	is	true	relative	to	him	at	the	time).	But	
relative	 to	 the	 eavesdropper	 at	 the	 time	 of	 her	 judgment	 John’s	 utterance	 is	 false	
(since	it	is	not	compatible	with	everything	that	the	eavesdropper	knows	at	the	time	of	
the	judgment	that	the	ball	is	under	cup	1),	and	that	is	why	the	eavesdropper	is	correct	




Rejecting	 the	 relativist	 account,	 von	 Fintel	 and	Gillies’s	 (2008)	 propose	 that	 coupled	
with	 a	 sufficiently	 enriched	 pragmatic	 theory	 the	 standard	 account	 can	 handle	
eavesdropper	cases.3	According	to	the	standard	account,	an	epistemic	use	of	‘Possibly	
S’	 determines	 a	 certain	 body	of	 knowledge	 as	 the	 conversational	 background,	 but	 it	
does	not	make	explicit	exactly	which	body	of	knowledge	this	is,	and	this	can	give	rise	to	
an	interpretational	ambiguity.	von	Fintel	and	Gillies	propose	that	sometimes	speakers	
exploit	 this	ambiguity,	and	would	say	 that	 this	 is	what	 John	 is	doing	 in	 the	 two	cups	
case.	 By	 uttering	 ‘The	 ball	 might	 be	 under	 cup	 1’,	 John	 puts	 into	 play	 at	 least	 two	
propositions,	 one	 being	 a	 solipsistic	 reading	 of	 ‘The	 ball	 might	 be	 under	 cup	 1’	 (on	
which	the	conversational	background	is	everything	that	John	knows),	the	other	being	a	
group	 reading	 (on	which	 the	 conversational	 background	 is	 everything	 that	 John	 and	
the	eavesdropper	together	know).	John	is	warranted	in	making	the	utterance	because	
he	is	warranted	in	asserting	at	least	one	of	these	two	propositions	(the	solipsistic	one).	








when	 she	 assesses	 John’s	 utterance	 her	 body	 of	 knowledge	 is	 to	 be	 included	 in	 the	
conversational	 background	 of	 the	 utterance,	 and	 her	 body	 of	 knowledge	 is	




judge	 ‘false’	 because	 John’s	 utterance	 is	 false,	 and	 John’s	 utterance	 is	 false	 because	
the	 ball	 is	 under	 neither	 cup,	 something	 that	 John	was	 not	 open	 at	 the	 time	of	 the	
utterance.	In	short,	this	is	just	another	instance	of	the	objectivity	problem.	Whether	or	
not	the	eavesdropper	is	correct	to	judge	‘false’	does	not	depend	on	what	she	knows.	
                                                
3		 Against	the	relativist	account	also	see	Hawthorne	(2007)	and	Wright	(2007).	
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ball	 might	 be	 under	 cup	 1’.	 In	 fact	 the	 ball	 is	 under	 neither.	 An	 ignorant	
eavesdropper	guesses	‘false’	of	John’s	utterance.	Her	guess	is	correct.	
	






Second,	 consider	 a	 modified	 case	 in	 which	 the	 ball	 is	 under	 cup	 2,	 and	 the	






























original	 two	cups	 case,	 the	eavesdropper	 is	 correct	 to	 judge	 ‘false’.	 She	 is	 correct	 to	































the	 actual	world	 than	 the	 second	 is	 –	 the	 second	 requires	 a	 greater	 deviation	 from	
actuality	than	the	first.	Presumably	it	 is	this	notion	of	closeness	to	which	David	Lewis	
(1973,	1986	pp.	20-7)	appeals	when	giving	his	account	of	counterfactual	conditionals:	
‘If	 it	 had	 snowed	 today	 then	 I	 would	 have	 gone	 skiing’	 expresses	 (in	 my	 mouth)	 a	
proposition	that	 is	true	 iff	every	closest	world	 in	which	 it	snowed	today	 is	a	world	 in	
which	I	went	skiing.	As	for	‘might’	counterfactuals:	‘If	it	had	snowed	today	then	I	might	
have	gone	skiing’	expresses	 (in	my	mouth)	a	proposition	 that	 is	 true	 iff	 some	closest	
world	in	which	it	snowed	today	is	a	world	in	which	I	went	skiing.	If	the	truth	or	falsity	
of	 our	 utterances	 of	 ‘If	 it	 were	 the	 case	 that	 A	 then	 it	might	 be	 the	 case	 that	 S’	 is	
sensitive	 to	 the	 closeness	of	worlds,	 then	 it	would	not	be	 surprising	 to	 find	 that	 the	
9 
truth	or	falsity	of	our	utterances	of	 ‘It	might	the	case	that	S’	 (and	‘Possibly	S’)	 is	also	
sensitive	to	the	closeness	of	worlds.	
	















whether	 there	 is	 a	 world	 in	 which	 the	 prejacent	 and	 the	 propositions	 in	 the	
conversational	background	are	all	true,	but	on	whether	there	is	such	a	world	within	d	












bay.	 Since	 the	 log	 does	 rule	 out	 the	 wreck	 being	 in	 that	 bay	 (as	 the	 mate	 later	
discovers),	 there	are	no	worlds	within	d	of	 the	actual	world	 in	which	 the	wreck	 is	 in	
that	bay,	and	so	the	mate’s	utterance	is	false.	
	
How	 does	 the	modified	 account	 handle	 the	 two	 cups	 case	 (original	 version)?	When	
John	asserts,	‘The	ball	might	be	under	cup	1’,	there	is	some	d	such	that	his	utterance	is	
true	iff	there	is	a	world	within	d	of	the	actual	world	in	which	the	ball	is	under	cup	1	and	











which	 the	 ball	 is	 under	 cup	 1,	 and	 since	 there	 are	 some	 such	 worlds	 in	 which	
everything	John	knows	in	the	actual	world	is	true,	John’s	utterance	is	true.	We	can	thus	
see	how	the	truth	of	John’s	utterance	depends	(a)	on	facts	about	how	the	world	is	that	
need	 not	 be	 known	 to	 anyone	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 utterance,	 and	 (b)	 in	 a	 way	 that	
depends	on	what	John	is	open	to:	the	latter	effects	the	value	of	d,	and	thus	how	close	




S’;	there	 is	some	d	such	that	the	utterance	is	true	 iff	there	 is	a	world	within	d	of	the	
actual	 world	 in	 which	 the	 prejacent	 p	 and	 the	 propositions	 in	 the	 conversational	





true,	 so	 the	utterance	 is	 false;	had	 the	 speaker	been	open	 to	q	being	 false	 then	 the	




is	 the	 proposition	 that	 the	 ball	 is	 under	 cup	 1	 or	 cup	 2.	 Nothing	 in	 the	 explanation	
assumes	 that	 the	 utterance	 is	 an	 epistemic	 use	 of	 ‘Possibly	 S’	 –	 the	 same	 form	 of	
explanation	can	be	used	for	the	metaphysical	and	deontic	cases	above.	
	
Thus	with	a	 simple	and	well-motivated	modification	of	 the	 standard	account	we	can	
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